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Culture Moderates Biases in Search Decisions 
 
Abstract 
Prior studies suggest that people often searched insufficiently in sequential search tasks 
compared with benchmark optimal strategies that maximize expected payoff. We point out that 
those studies were mostly conducted in individualist Western cultures; Easterners from 
collectivist cultures, with their higher susceptibility to escalation of commitment induced by 
sunk search costs, could exhibit a reversal of this under-search bias by searching more than 
optimally (only) when search costs are high. We tested our theory in four experiments. In our 
pilot experiment, participants generally under-searched when search cost was low, but only 
Eastern participants over-searched when search cost was high. Experiments 1 and 2 offered 
evidence for our hypothesized effects via a cultural priming manipulation on bicultural 
participants through interface language. We obtained further process evidence for our theory in 
Experiment 3, in which we made sunk costs non-salient in the search task – as expected, cross-
cultural effects became largely mitigated. 
 
Keywords: search, culture, individualism vs. collectivism, sunk costs, escalation of 
commitment, biculturalism, priming by interface language
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Culture Moderates Biases in Search Decisions 
 
Search is a very general class of sequential decision making. In essence, it involves 
trading off between the opportunity to acquire more information or options that can benefit 
decision, and the cost of such an acquisition. As an illustration, consider a scenario in which a 
new model of a popular smartphone is out in the market. A consumer may visit one retailer after 
another, examining their offers one at a time, before making a purchase. At each visit, the 
consumer has to decide whether to stop at that point to buy the best available offer encountered 
so far, or to visit yet another retailer, which will incur a search cost (in terms of time, effort, 
transportation, etc.) but potentially lead to the discovery of a better deal.  
Theories of rational decisions have provided “optimal stopping” strategies that maximize 
expected payoff in models of search (DeGroot, 1970; Weitzman, 1979). Prior experimental 
research on these models found that people often searched insufficiently compared with optimal 
benchmarks (e.g., Seale & Rapoport, 1997, and the review in Bearden & Rapoport, 2005). Such 
“under-search” bias is consistent with empirical findings that consumers engaged in rather 
limited search for a wide range of products (Beales, Mazis, Salop, & Staelin, 1981; Dickson & 
Sawyer, 1990; Moorthy, Ratchford, & Talukdar, 1997), and anecdotal evidence that grocery 
consumers searched less than retail executives expected (see e.g., Urbany, Dickson, & 
Kalapurakal, 1996). But Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan (2003) provided a 
contravening exception to these results: in their experiment, participants tended to search too 
much (“over-search”) relative to the optimal stopping strategy (only) when search costs were 
high. It has never been completely clarified how such deviations from previous findings could 
have occurred.  
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The present research explores the explanation that Zwick et al. (2003)’s experiments 
were conducted with culturally collectivist (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995) Eastern participants 
in Hong Kong, whereas previous studies were largely conducted with participants from 
individualist Western cultures. That is, the individualism-collectivism dimension of culture 
might have a moderating effect on participants’ biases in search decisions relative to optimal 
stopping strategies. However, Zwick et al. (2003) suggest that the posited effects appear only at 
high search costs; that is, search decisions are not straightforwardly impacted by culture, but by 
an interaction of cross-cultural differences (along the individualism-collectivism dimension) and 
search costs. This motivates the following conceptual development for our study.  
Conceptual Development: Search, Escalation of Commitment, and Culture 
Standard economic theorizing prescribes that, over the process of a sequential search 
task, decision makers (DMs) should only evaluate the costs and expected gains of additional 
searches. However, prior research (e.g., Kogut, 1990) suggests that DMs would often be 
influenced by sunk costs of previous searches. It can also be expected that sunk costs would 
influence DMs via escalation of commitment, i.e., strengthening the commitment to continue to 
search, instead of choosing to stop searching, over and above standard economic concerns 
(Thaler, 1980; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Previous studies suggest that risk seeking people are 
especially susceptible to this effect (Philips, Battalio, & Kogut, 1991; Keil et al., 2000). Lastly, it 
has been observed that Easterners (Westerners) appeared to be risk seeking (risk averse) in 
financial decisions (Weber & Hsee, 1998; Hsee & Weber, 1999). This has been interpreted as 
resulting from the contrast in collectivism versus individualism between Eastern and Western 
cultures. As Weber & Hsee (1998, p.1208) explained, in collectivist cultures, “family or other in-
group members will step in to help out any group member who encounters a large and possibly 
SEARCH AND CULTURE  3 
 
 
catastrophic loss after selecting a risky option. In individualist cultures … a person making a 
risky decision will be expected to personally bear the (possibly adverse) consequences of their 
decisions. Collectivism thus acts as a cushion against possible losses.” 
To sum up, there appears to be a qualitative difference in risk attitude between Easterners 
and Westerns, which is driven by the collectivism/individualism contrast. This difference could 
then lead to a difference in susceptibility to sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment. 
Consistently, Keil et al. (2000) found that Easterners had a higher inclination toward escalation 
of commitment than Westerners in the domain of software project development, largely because 
of more risk taking. Applying this insight to search decisions, we conjecture that, because of 
Easterners’ higher susceptibility to sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment, Easterners are 
more inclined towards over-search than Westerners are when sunk search costs become high. 
Overview of the Experimental Setup 
To examine our conjecture, we carried out four experiments using a simple price search 
task that is based on a paradigm with a long usage (see e.g., Rapoport & Tversky, 1970). In our 
setup, a DM has to purchase one unit of a virtual product with a known value, and obtains price 
quotes for the product one at a time. Every time the DM obtains a price quote, he/she makes a 
choice between stopping search to make a purchase, and committing to continue to search in the 
sense of obtaining one more price quote at a known search cost. Price quotes are independently 
and identically distributed random variables with a distribution function known by the DM 
before the search begins. All searched offers are always available (perfect recall), so that a DM 
who has stopped is assumed to purchase at the minimum price quote he/she has encountered. The 
DM’s payoff from a purchase is thus the value of the product minus the sum of the minimum 
price quote obtained and the total search cost incurred. 
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In our pilot experiment, search costs were constant with search; we compared the 
decisions of Western/Eastern participants from distinctly individualist/collectivist cultures at 
different search costs, in order to obtain support for our basic theoretical premises. In 
Experiments 1 to 3, search costs increased with search. Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to 
offer evidence for our hypothesized effects via a cultural priming manipulation on bicultural 
participants through interface language. In these two experiments, as in the pilot experiment, the 
participant was provided with the total incurred search cost (and by implication, the sunk cost) at 
all points of decision. In Experiment 3, we omitted such information at all points of decision to 
make sunk costs non-salient; our aim was to examine if cross-cultural differences in search 
decisions would be mitigated, as our theory predicts. 
Pilot Experiment 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and eight students from a UK (32 females, 13 males) and a 
Thai (44 females, 19 males) university participated in the experiment. Both universities were 
ranked among the top in their countries; the experiment had received ethical approval from the 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the UK participants’ university, as well as from the 
Thai participants’ university. The participants were recruited from a pool of behavioral 
experiment subjects in their university over a one-month period up to the date of the 
experimental session. The participants were made aware that they would be participating, with 
payment, in a decision making study that would last approximately one hour. Only participants 
who were national citizens were allowed to participate, to ensure consistency in cultural 
background. The country comparison data at the Hofstede Centre website (Hofstede Centre, 
2014) show that both cultures score moderately low to moderately high on five of the six cultural 
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dimensions listed: respectively for UK vs. Thailand, the scores are (out of 100) 35 vs. 64 on 
power distance, 66 vs. 34 on masculinity, 35 vs. 64 on uncertainty avoidance, 51 vs. 32 on long 
term orientation, and 69 vs. 45 on indulgence. However, the two cultures are very different on 
the remaining dimension, namely the individualism score: 89 in the UK versus 20 in Thailand.  
Design and procedure. The experiment had a 2 (culture: UK vs. Thai) × 2 (search cost: 
low vs. high) between-subjects design. Across all conditions, every price quote was generated by 
a random draw (rounded to the nearest integer) from a normal distribution with mean = 430 
tokens and standard deviation = 50 tokens, token being the experimental currency used 
throughout our research. The value of the virtual object of search was controlled to be 700 tokens 
in all conditions. The participants’ earnings in the experimental currency were converted to real 
currency for payment at the end of the experiment.  
Every participant played 45 search games with the same search cost. These included five 
practice games, followed by 40 actual games for payment. In each game, the participant visited 
one or more “shops” to purchase one product item with the value of 700 tokens. With each visit, 
the participant obtained a price quote that was randomly generated according to the normal 
distribution defined earlier. The participant visited the first shop with no cost, but afterwards 
every additional visit incurred a constant search cost. This search cost was manipulated at two 
levels across conditions: 5 tokens per search (low search cost) and 15 tokens per search (high 
search cost). The participant was provided with the total incurred search cost (i.e., the sunk cost) 
at all points of decision. Upon making a purchase, the participant paid a purchase price that was 
equal to the minimum price quote obtained during the search. Each participant could view a 
history screen at any time to access the price quotes obtained so far in the search. The 
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participant’s net payoff in the game was the product value of 700 tokens minus the search costs 
incurred over the course of the game, and the purchase price. 
A sample of the experimental instructions, including sample decision and feedback 
screens of the experimental program interface, is included in Appendix B. The program was 
written using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). All participants conducted the task with 
instructions and program interface in their native language. Two professional translators made 
double back translations of all textual materials from English to Thai and from Thai to English to 
ensure consistency across conditions. We also ensured that the participants understood the search 
task by having them complete a quiz after reading the instructions (see Appendix B). As with the 
other experiments in this research, almost all participants completed their quiz correctly, and any 
erroneous answers were pointed out to the participant by the experimenter with a full explanation 
before the experiment began.  
Three games were randomly selected after the experiment was over. Each participant’s 
payment was his/her average earnings from those three games converted to real currency at the 
rate of 1 token = £0.01 for the UK sessions (£1 ≈ US$1.6) and 1 token = 0.13 Thai baht for the 
Thai sessions (1 Thai baht ≈ US$0.033). These exchange rates were designed so that one token 
was worth about three to four times in US dollars to a UK participant compared with a Thai 
participant; this was approximately the ratio of the two countries’ gross domestic product per 
capita based on purchase-power-parity in current international dollars over 2010 to 2013 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013), when our experiments were conducted. In addition, each 
participant was paid a show-up fee of £3 in the UK sessions and 40 Thai baht in the Thai  
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UK, Low search cost Thai, Low search cost 
    
UK, High search cost Thai, High search cost 
  
 
Fig. 1. Observed purchases in the pilot experiment. Each dot represents one observed purchase. The dashed lines mark the mean 
observed purchase price by number of searches. The dotted lines mark the theoretical expected purchase prices under the optimal 
strategy. The straight lines mark the threshold prices for acceptance under the optimal strategy; that is, under the optimal strategy, no 
purchase observations should lie above the straight lines. 
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sessions. Average participant payment was £6 in the UK sessions and 78.5 Thai baht in the Thai 
sessions. 
Results 
In the low search cost conditions, an expected payoff-maximizing DM should stop 
searching as soon as he obtained a price quote that was not higher than 384 tokens (see Appendix 
A). In the high search cost conditions, the corresponding threshold was 419 tokens. These 
thresholds form the benchmark optimal strategies against which we compare participants’ 
decisions. The panels in Fig. 1 present the observed purchases in the experiment in each 
condition alongside benchmark predictions. In the figure, each dot represents a purchase 
characterized by the number of searches and the purchase price. The dashed lines mark the mean 
observed purchase price by number of searches. The dotted lines mark the theoretical expected 
purchase prices under the optimal strategy. Lastly, the straight lines mark the threshold prices for 
acceptance under the optimal strategy; dots above the straight lines are symptomatic of under-
searching and over-paying with respect to the optimal benchmarks.  
Comparing the panels across cultures controlling for the level of search cost, we observe 
that: (a) the patterns of purchase observations at low search cost are largely the same across 
cultures and indicate a tendency for under-search biases; but (b) there are marked cross-cultural  
differences at high search cost, characterized by more long searches with low purchase prices 
among the Eastern participants compared with the Western participants. These observations are 
consistent with our general premise that Easterners search more than Westerners only when 
search cost is high, when sunk cost has high impact by implication.  
Table 1 lists the main results from the experiment, and indicates whether an observed 
mean in a condition is significantly different from the benchmark expected value in the 
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“Optimal” columns. The table thus suggests that, consistent with our theorizing: (a) both cultures 
under-searched and over-paid at low search cost with respect to the optimal benchmarks; (b) the 
Western participants searched optimally at high search cost; (c) the Eastern participants over-
searched and under-paid at high search cost. 
 
Table 1. Main Results from the Pilot Experiment 
 
 Mean number of searches  
 UK Thai Optimal 
Low search cost 
4.17 (1.65) [3.44, 4.90] 
p=.001; N=22 
3.79 (1.01) [3.35, 4.22] 
p < .001; N=23 
5.48 
High search cost 
2.55 (0.57) [2.30, 2.79]  
p > .250; N=23 
2.83 (0.37) [2.71, 2.95] 
p < .001; N=40 
2.42 
 
 Mean purchase price 
 UK Thai Optimal 
Low search cost 
372 (15.54) [365, 379] 
p < .001 
375 (9.06) [371, 379] 
p < .001 
358 
High search cost 
381(12.09) [376, 386] 
p > .250 
380 (5.11) [378, 381] 
p < .001 383 
 
Note: The entries were calculated with participant as the unit of observation; the values in 
parentheses are the SDs and those in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals. The 
underlined entries highlight a significant effect of culture according to t-test (p = .019) that is 
discussed in more detail in the Results section for this experiment. The column “Optimal” lists 
the expected value of the relevant dependent variable in the experiment under the expected 
payoff-maximizing strategy. The p values indicate the results from comparing the mean of the 
corresponding dependent variable with its expected value under the optimal strategy by t-test. 
The experimental task instructions and interfaces were in the participant’s native language in 
every condition. 
 
Table 1 suggests an interaction effect with the number of searches. Indeed, a 2 (culture: 
UK vs. Thai) × 2 (search cost: low vs. high) between-subjects ANOVA for the number of 
searches does not yield a significant effect of culture (F(1,104)=0.06, p > .250, 001.2 <pη ), but 
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reveals a marginally significant interaction effect (F(1,104)=3.24, p = .075, 030.2 =pη ). We 
follow up with t-tests for simple effects of culture at each level of search cost; we do not find a 
significant effect at low search cost (t(43) = 0.95, p > .250, Cohen’s d = 0.28) but find a 
significant effect at high search cost (t(61)=2.42, p = .019, Cohen’s d = 0.62). That is, our 
Eastern participants made a similar number of (more) searches compared with Western 
participants at low (high) search cost. Nevertheless, the two cultures did not purchase at very 
different prices on average controlling for search cost: a similar ANOVA with purchase price as 
the dependent variable does not yield a significant main effect of culture nor any significant 
interaction in both cases (main effect of culture: F(1,104)=0.18, p > .250, 002.2 =pη ; interaction: 
F(1,104)=1.29, p > .250, 012.2 =pη ). 
Discussion 
The pilot experiment lends some support to our theoretical premises: at low search cost, 
both Western and Eastern participants – from distinctly individualist and collectivist cultures – 
under-searched and purchased at higher prices compared with the optimal benchmarks; but at 
high search cost, collectivist Eastern participants over-searched and under-paid with respect to 
the optimal benchmarks, while individualist Western participants searched optimally. 
Experiment 1 
While the pilot experiment established preliminary evidence for our premise, a serious 
concern is that the participant populations representing different cultures might differ in many 
non-culture-specific aspects that might affect their search decisions. Experiment 1 was designed 
to remedy the concern by culturally priming participants from a bicultural population via the task 
interface language.  
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Bicultural participants exhibit mental “frame switching” when primed with one or the 
other of their cultures (see e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-
Martinez, 2000; Sui & Han, 2007). Previous studies show that language can be an effective 
means to achieve this form of priming (e.g., Luna, Ringberg, & Peracchio, 2008; Ross, Xun, & 
Wilson, 2002). Of particular relevance is the research by Kemmelmeier and Cheng (2004), who 
demonstrated that, among their bicultural participants, a Western (Eastern) language could 
activate self-construals that were normative in individualist (collectivist) cultures (see also 
Hoffman, Lau, & Johnson, 1986, for a related study). Accordingly, we posit that, in our search 
framework, interface language could be used as a cultural priming manipulation for a bicultural 
population. That is, bicultural participants’ decision biases would be moderated by the interface 
language, so that they are more prone to over-search bias when performing the experimental task 
in their Eastern language than in their Western language.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty participants, who did not take part in the pilot 
experiment, participated in Experiment 1. The UK (23 females, 13 males) and Thai (53 females, 
31 males) participants were students from the same universities as in the pilot experiment; the 
experiment had also received ethical approval from the same authorities as in the pilot 
experiment. The participants were recruited via similar procedures as in the pilot experiment, 
except that the Thai participants were Thai nationals recruited from an international business 
program in which English was the official language of instructions. Those participants had been 
typically brought up in a bicultural, bilingual atmosphere, such as an international school system. 
They had been habitually exposed to Western culture through their course materials (almost all 
of them having made at least one semester of exchange visit to the West), as well as interactions 
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with hundreds of Western exchange students and Western educated faculty. Moreover, the 
students generally accessed both Thai and English-language entertainment and news on a regular 
basis. To sum up, the Thai participants in this experiment were from a highly westernized 
Eastern population who were bicultural to a comparable extent as bicultural participants in 
previous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Kemmelmeier & Cheng, 2004). The 
participants were made aware that they would be participating, with payment, in a decision 
making study that would last approximately one hour. 
Design and procedure. Experiment 1 had a 3(UK vs. Thai (English interface) vs. Thai 
(Thai interface)) between-subjects design. All conditions involved the same search task, which 
was identical to that in the pilot experiment except that search cost increased proportionally with 
search. Specifically, the cost of obtaining one more price quote after having obtained i price 
quotes was 5i. Implementing a search task with increasing search cost added more interest to our 
experiment, as it went beyond the constant search cost paradigm in the pilot experiment that is 
typical of much of relevant previous research. Moreover, it reflects realistic situations where 
search cost increases with search (e.g., a consumer might begin search around familiar shops in 
the neighborhood, but further searches would involve travelling to less familiar shops in more 
distant locations). Lastly, in this setting, the total sunk search cost – which was provided to the 
participant at all points of decision (cf. the left panel of Fig. 4) – increased rapidly with searches. 
This could make cross-cultural differences in susceptibility to escalation of commitment more 
pronounced than the high search cost condition in the pilot experiment, but without the need to 
impose a prohibitively high search cost from the first search onward.  
Average participant payment was £5.9 in the UK sessions, 77 Thai baht in the Thai 
(English interface) sessions, and 75.4 Thai baht in the Thai (Thai interface) sessions.  
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Results 
In the experiment, an expected payoff-maximizing DM should search with a threshold 
price that increased as the number of searches increased (see Appendix A). This forms the 
benchmark optimal strategy against which we compare participants’ decisions. The panels in Fig. 
2 present the observed purchases in the experiment in each condition alongside benchmark 
predictions, with similar notations as in Fig. 1. Comparing the figures across conditions suggests 
that, as expected: (a) the patterns of purchase observations are largely the same between the 
Western participants and the bicultural participants conducting the experiment in English; but (b) 
these two patterns are markedly different from that of the bicultural participants conducting the 
experiment in their Eastern language. The main difference is that the latter tended to make more 
long searches before making purchases.  
Table 2 lists the main results from the experiment, and indicates whether an observed 
mean in a condition is significantly different from the benchmark expected value in the 
“Optimal” columns. The table suggests that: (a) the Western participants searched approximately 
optimally; (b) the bicultural participants, when conducting the experiment in their Eastern 
language, tended to over-search and under-pay with respect to the optimal benchmarks. We carry 
out t-tests comparing the Western participants with the bicultural participants conducting the 
experiment in their Eastern language, with number of searches and purchase price as the 
dependent variables. Both tests yield significant effects (number of searches: t(83) = -3.68, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 0.81; purchase price: t(83) = 4.17, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.92). It appears that, 
with the more rapidly increasing sunk search cost in this experiment compared with the pilot 
experiment, cross-cultural differences were more prominent than in the earlier experiment.  
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UK 
 
Thai (English interface) 
 
Thai (Thai interface) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Observed purchases in Experiment 1. See the caption under Fig. 1for notations. 
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Table 2. Main Results from Experiment 1 
Mean number of searches  
UK Thai 
(English interface) 
Thai 
(Thai interface) 
Optimal 
2.69 (0.50) [2.52, 2.86] 
p=.206; N=36 
2.84 (0.31) [2.73, 2.95] 
p < .001; N=35 
3.23 (0.77) [3.01, 3.45] 
p < .001; N=49 
2.58 
Mean purchase price  
UK Thai 
(English interface) 
Thai 
(Thai interface) 
Optimal 
385 (9.13) [382, 388] 
p=.147 
381 (5.19) [380, 383] 
p=.076 
378 (6.60) [376, 380] 
p < .001 
383 
 
Note: See the note under Table 1 for notations, except that every bold entry highlights a 
significant difference from the comparable entry in the Thai (Thai interface) condition according 
to t-test (p < .05), which is discussed in more detail in the Results section for this experiment. 
 
Table 2 also suggests that: (a) while the bicultural participants in the English language 
condition indeed over-searched, the extent was notably less than that of the other bicultural 
participants who conducted the experiment in their Eastern language; (b) the bicultural 
participants in the English language condition only marginally under-paid with respect to the 
optimal benchmark. Both observations are consistent with our hypothesized moderating effect of 
culture. Pairwise t-test comparisons show that there are significant differences between the two 
groups of bicultural participants conducting the experiment in their Western versus Eastern 
languages (number of searches:  t(82)=-2.84, p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.63; purchase price: 
t(82)=2.42, p =.018, Cohen’s d = 0.53). The differences are both in directions that bring the 
bicultural participants conducting the experiment in English closer to the Western participants 
compared with the other bicultural participants. 
Discussion 
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Experiment 1 lends further support to our theorizing by: (a) demonstrating similar effects 
as found in the pilot experiment for a search task with increasing search cost, and (b) showing 
that such differences persisted or are largely mitigated depending on the experimental interface 
language used by the bicultural participants.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aims to strengthen our evidence from Experiment 1 by means of a within-
subjects design. We also obtained supporting process evidence to our theorizing by comparing 
measures of participants’ susceptibility to sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment at the end 
of every session. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two bicultural Thai (48 females, 14 males) participants, who were 
recruited from the same international business program as the participants in Experiment 1 via 
similar procedures, took part in both sessions of the experiment (two participants took part in the 
first session but did not attend the second one; their data are not included in the analysis reported 
here). The participants were from a different cohort than those in Experiment 1, and did not take 
part in the pilot experiment either. The experiment had received ethical approval from the 
participants’ university. The participants were made aware that they would be participating, with 
payment, in a decision making study that would last approximately one hour. 
Design and procedure. The experiment consisted of two sessions separated by 
approximately three months. The setup of every session, including the search task and the 
manipulation via interface language (as well as the provision of the total sunk search cost to the 
participant at all points of decision), was identical to that in Experiment 1. In the first session, the 
participants conducted the experiment in either English (30 participants) or Thai (32 
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participants). In the second session, a participant conducted the experiment in Thai if he/she 
conducted the first session in English, and vice versa. As result, every participant conducted the 
experiment in his/her Eastern language in one session and his/her Western language in the other 
session, while the order of interface language across sessions was counterbalanced among the 
participants. Average participant payment was 77.3 Thai baht in the first session and 79 Thai 
baht in the second session.  
Process measures. At the end of each session, we surveyed every participant for his/her 
susceptibility to sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment using a three-question 
questionnaire. The questions were adapted from the scenarios in Experiments 1 and 6 in Arkes 
and Blumer (1985) and Example 5 in Thaler (1980). The questionnaire was presented in the 
same language as the interface language with which the participant conducted the experiment in 
the session just completed (see Appendix C for the English version of the questionnaire). Results 
We first check for order effect by examining the interaction effect in a 2(order of 
interface language across sessions: English then Thai vs. Thai then English) × 2(interface 
language: English vs. Thai) mixed-design ANOVA for the number of searches, where the first 
factor is between-subjects while the second factor is within-subjects. The analysis yields a 
marginally significant interaction effect (F(1,60)=3.15, p = .081, 050.2 =pη ). A similar mixed-
design ANOVA for the purchase price does not yield a significant interaction effect 
(F(1,60)=1.52, p = .22, 025.2 =pη ). We conclude that the order of interface languages had not 
exerted an overall significant influence on our major results – which focus on within-subjects 
comparisons between search decisions under different interface languages. Henceforth we shall 
analyze the data as in a simple two-factor (interface language: English vs. Thai) within-subjects 
design.   
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The panels in Fig. 3 present the observed purchases in each interface language condition 
with similar notations as in Fig. 1. The patterns of purchase observations are consistent with 
those for the bicultural participants in Experiment 1. That is, participants tended to make more 
long searches before making purchases when conducting the experiment in their Eastern 
(compared with Western) language.  
Table 3 lists the main results from the experiment, and indicates whether an observed 
mean in a condition is significantly different from the benchmark expected value. The table 
suggests findings that are similar to those in Experiment 1. That is, the participants over-searched 
and under-paid with respect to the optimal benchmarks in both conditions, but their biases were 
notably more severe when they conducted the experiment in their Eastern (compared with 
Western) language. In other words, the same bicultural participants under different cultural 
priming manipulations had their search decisions moderated in our hypothesized directions. Our 
observations are further supported by within-subjects ANOVA for the two major dependent 
variables, which  reveal significant differences in the hypothesized directions (number of 
searches:  F(1,61)=54.21, p < .001, 47.2 =pη ; purchase price: :  F(1,61)=54.21, p = .001, 
16.2 =pη ).  
Process evidence. Table 4 lists the main results from the process measure questionnaire 
administered at the end of each session. In our analysis, participants’ replies to each question are 
converted into scores such that a higher score indicates a higher susceptibility to sunk cost-
induced escalation of commitment (cf. the coding explanation in the first column of Table 4). As 
mentioned before, each participant completed the questionnaire in the same language as the 
interface language by which he/she conducted the experiment in the session just completed; the 
results in Table 4 are thus listed separately for the different languages.  
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English interface 
  
Thai interface 
  
Fig. 3. Observed purchases in Experiment 2. See the caption under Fig. 1for notations. 
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Table 3. Main Results from Experiment 2 (N = 62) 
Mean number of searches  
English interface Thai interface Optimal 
2.78 (0.23) [2.72, 2.83] 
p <.001 
3.20 (0.41) [3.10, 3.30] 
p <.001 
2.58 
Mean purchase price 
English interface Thai interface Optimal 
380 (5.23) [378, 381] 
p <.001 
376 (7.24) [374, 378] 
p <.001 
383 
 
Note: See the note under Table 1 for notations, except that every pair of neighboring underlined 
entries highlight a significant effect of culture according to within-subjects ANOVA  (p ≤ .001) 
that is discussed in more detail in the Results section for this experiment. 
Table 4. Main Results from the Process Measure Questionnaire in Experiment 2 (N = 62) 
Question English interface Thai interface 
Q1 (“Village house” = 0,  
“Seaside hotel” = 1) 
.47 (.50) [.34, .60] .61 (.49) [.49, .74] 
Q2 (“No preference” = 0,  
“bt65 Meal” = 1;  
no participant replied “bt40 Meal”) 
.26 (.44) [.15, .37] .42 (.50) [.29, .55] 
Q3 (score as in questionnaire) 2.87 (0.98) [2.62, 3.12] 3.21 (0.89) [2.98, 3.44] 
 
Note: See Appendix C for the complete questionnaire. The values in parentheses are the SDs and 
those in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 4 suggests that, with respect to every one of the three questions, participants 
exhibited higher susceptibility to sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment when the question 
was in their Eastern (compared with Western) language. This is consistent with our theorizing. 
SEARCH AND CULTURE  21 
 
 
The standardized Cronbach’s alphas for the three scores are .57 in English and .70 in 
Thai, suggesting poor reliability for the former and acceptable reliability for the latter. As such, 
we do not combine each participant’s scores to form a single scale, but carry out statistical 
analysis in consideration of the scores as related dependent variables. With this approach, we 
obtain further support to our observations by a within-subjects two-factor (interface language: 
English vs. Thai) MANOVA with the three scores as the three dependent variables. The analysis 
reveals a significant main effect of interface language, Wilks’ Lambda = .91, F(1,61) = 6.39, p 
=.014, 095.2 =pη . We next calculate every participant’s difference in scores for each question 
when the question was presented in English versus Thai, through which we obtain three 
difference scores for each participant. We then analyze the correlations of the difference scores 
with the participant’s corresponding differences in mean number of searches and mean purchase 
price by interface language. We find significant (Q1, Q2) and marginally significant (Q3) 
positive correlations with number of searches (Q1: r(60) = .42, 95% CI = [.19,.60], p < .001; Q2: 
r(60) = .28, 95% CI = [.030,.49], p = .027; Q3: r(60) = .24, 95% CI = [-.007,.46], p = .055), 
while the correlations with purchase price are non-significantly negative (Q1: r(60) = -.17, 95% 
CI = [-.41,.080], p = .17; Q2: r(60) = -.11, 95% CI = [-.35,.14], p = .39; Q3: r(60) = -.043, 95% 
CI = [-.29,.21], p = .74). That is, all correlations are in the theorized directions, and are largely 
significantly so with the number of searches. Overall, we conclude that our process measures 
offer consistent evidence for our theorizing; that is, Eastern (versus Western) cultural priming 
manipulations, as implemented by interface language in our experiment, led to increased 
susceptibility to sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment among our bicultural participants 
and an ensuing over-search bias. 
Discussion 
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Experiment 2 lends further support to our theorizing and our results from Experiment 1, 
but here in a within-subjects context. In addition, our process measures provide further evidence 
for our theorizing, namely that escalation of commitment leads to the moderating effects of 
cross-cultural differences on search decisions.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 aims to provide more concrete process evidence to our theorizing. If sunk 
search costs, rather than other confounding factors, drive the observed moderating effects in the 
previous experiments, then making sunk costs non-salient to participants, as in the present 
experiment, should mitigate or even eliminate any such effects. 
Method  
Participants. Sixty-eight UK (10 females, 8 males) and Thai (38 females, 12 males) 
participants, who did not take part in the previously reported experiments, participated in this 
experiment. The participants were recruited from the same populations as those in Experiment 1 
via similar procedures. The Western and Eastern participants conducted the experiment through 
an interface in English and Thai respectively. The experiment had received ethical approval from 
the same authorities as in the pilot experiment. The participants were made aware that they 
would be participating, with payment, in a decision making study that would last approximately 
one hour. 
Design and procedure. The experiment consisted of two conditions, each corresponding 
to a culture (UK vs. Thai). The procedures were identical to those for Experiment 1 except that 
sunk cost information was made non-salient at the points of decision. We made sunk costs non-
salient through removing feedback related to the total incurred search cost at all points of 
decision during search (see the right panel of Fig. 4); by contrast, in the pilot experiment as well 
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as Experiments 1 and 2, this feedback was always provided to the participant at all points of 
decision (see the left panel of Fig. 4). Standard economic theorizing prescribes that the DM 
should only consider the tradeoff between search cost to be incurred and the expected gain from 
further search. The two versions of the decisions screen in Fig. 4 do not differ in their provision 
of such information. As a result, the benchmark optimal strategy and its predictions remain the 
same regardless of our sunk cost salience manipulation. 
Average participant payment was £6.2 in the UK sessions and 78.5 Thai baht in the Thai 
sessions.  
Results 
The panels in Fig. 5 present the observed purchases in each condition with similar 
notations as in Fig. 1. The patterns of purchase observations are largely the same between the 
Western and Eastern participants in the present experiment, when sunk costs were non-salient 
(note that there are only two observations of purchases with more than nine searches among the 
Eastern participants in this experiment; thus the rather low purchase prices in the Thai panel 
corresponding to these outliers are not necessarily representative of population behavior). This 
observation is consistent with our premise that sunk cost effects are a key driver of the cross-
cultural differences in biases in search decisions. It is also consistent with Table 5, which lists the 
main results from the experiment and indicates whether an observed mean in a condition is 
significantly different from the benchmark expected value.  
We combine the data from this experiment with the data from Experiment 1 pertaining 
only to Western participants and bicultural participants who conducted the experiment in their 
Eastern language (recall that the Thai participants in both experiments were from the same
SEARCH AND CULTURE       24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Sample decision screens: sunk costs salient (Experiments 1 and 2, left) and sunk costs non-salient (Experiment 3, right). 
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UK 
 
Thai 
 
Fig. 5. Observed purchases in Experiment 3. See the caption under Fig. 1for notations. 
Table 5. Main Results from Experiment 3 
Mean number of searches  
UK Thai Optimal 
2.73 (0.51) [2.47, 2.98] 
p=.242; N=18 
2.52 (0.43) [2.40, 2.65] 
p >.250; N=50 
2.58 
Mean purchase price 
UK Thai Optimal 
381 (8.47) [377, 386] 
p >.250 
386 (6.65) [384, 388] 
p=.007 
383 
 
Note: See the note under Table 1 for notations, except that the underlined entries highlight a 
significant effect of culture according to t-test (p = .037) that is discussed in more detail in the 
Results section for this experiment. 
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bicultural population). A 2 (culture: UK vs. Thai) × 2 (sunk cost: salient vs. non-salient) 
between-subjects ANOVA for number of searches reveals a main effect of sunk cost salience 
(F(1,149)=10.59, p = .001, 066.2 =pη ) and an interaction effect (F(1,149)=13.16, p < .001, 
081.2 =pη ), while the main effect of culture is not significant (F(1,149)=2.71, p = .102, 
018.2 =pη ). As reported earlier for Experiment 1, the number of searches differed significantly 
across cultures under salient sunk costs. However, additional t-test shows that this simple effect 
went away under non-salient sunk costs (t(66) = 1.63, p = .107, Cohen’s d = 0.40). That is, 
Eastern participants in a salient sunk cost condition searched significantly more than all other 
conditions, in support of our theory. 
A similar ANOVA for purchase price reveals only a significant interaction effect 
(F(1,149)=18.20, p < .001, 109.2 =pη ) but non-significant effects otherwise (main effect of sunk 
cost salience: F(1,149)=2.00, p = .159, 013.2 =pη ; main effect of culture: F(1,149)=1.25, p > 
.250, 008.2 =pη .) Pairwise comparisons reveal that the purchase price of the Eastern participants 
was significantly higher than that of the Western participants when sunk costs were non-salient 
(t(66) = 2.11, p = .037, Cohen’s d = 0.52). That is, surprisingly, making sunk costs non-salient in 
effect reversed the general differences in purchase prices across cultures in this research.  
Discussion 
Experiment 3 lends further process evidence to our theorizing by showing that, once sunk 
costs became non-salient, the previously observed cross-cultural effects on search decisions were 
largely mitigated.  
General Discussion 
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Our research brings insights from cross-cultural studies to research on search decisions, 
with substantive consequences supported by process evidence involving sunk cost effects. In the 
pilot experiment, both Western and Eastern participants – from distinctly individualist and 
collectivist cultures – under-searched when search cost was low; but only the Eastern 
participants over-searched when search cost was high. Experiments 1 and 2 show that a change 
in interface language conceived as cultural priming could change bicultural participants’ biases 
in search decisions in hypothesized directions. The process measures in Experiment 2 lend 
support to the theorized role of sunk cost-induced escalation of commitment in the phenomena 
we study. Experiment 3 provides more concrete process evidence by showing that a simple 
manipulation that made sunk costs non-salient could largely mitigate cross-cultural differences in 
search decisions. 
Both our theory and experiments highlight that search decisions are not impacted 
straightforwardly by culture, but by an interaction of cross-cultural differences (along the 
individualism-collectivism dimension) and sunk search costs. Thus culture had an impact on 
search only in the high search cost condition in the pilot experiment, while in Experiment 3, its 
impact was mitigated once search costs became non-salient. This implies that our results cannot 
be fully explained by cross-cultural differences that may lead to only a main effect of culture on 
search. These include, for example, a direct (i.e., not via sunk cost effects) application of the 
finding that Westerners (Easterners) tended to be risk averse (risk seeking) in financial decisions 
(Weber & Hsee, 1998; Hsee & Weber, 1999); or the finding that Easterners tended to exhibit less 
delay discounting than Westerners (Kim, Sung, & McClure, 2012). 
We have not detected an overall impact of within-session learning in our experiments 
(see Appendix D), suggesting that learning or related factors cannot account for our main 
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findings either. The heuristic explanations explored in previous search experiments (e.g., 
Bearden & Rapoport, 2005) are also of limited use here. Those explanations were aimed at 
under-search rather than over-search biases, while we need to account for over-search at high 
search costs among collectivist participants. For example, satisficing heuristics, by which the 
decision maker compromises with outcomes that are “sufficiently” good, might be expected to 
lead to under-search only. Nevertheless, experimentation that investigates cross-cultural 
differences in search heuristics might provide an avenue for future research. It would also be 
worthwhile to test relevant hypotheses in our theorizing that are supported by previous literature 
but not addressed in our experiments. Finally, our experimental task, with its simple design, 
avails itself of further worthwhile development in computational decision making modelling. For 
example, we can simulate the search decisions of decision makers with various degrees of sunk 
cost sensitivity, and then compare with data from corresponding experimentation. 
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Culture Moderates Biases in Search Decisions 
Supplemental Material 
Appendix A: Optimal Search Strategies in the Experiments 
The search tasks in all our experiments share the following feature: if the decision maker 
(DM) stops after obtaining exactly t price quotes, his/her payoff can be expressed as:  
∑
−
=
−−=
1
0
321321 },...,,min{),...,,(
t
i
ittt cppppuppppπ ,  
where ip  (i = 1, 2, 3, … t) denotes the i-th price quote obtained, 00 =c , ic (i > 0) denotes the 
cost to obtain one more price quote when the DM has already obtained i price quotes, and u (= 
700 tokens in all experiments) is the value of the purchased product to the DM.  
The pilot experiment  
The search task in the pilot experiment has constant search costs, i.e., cci = = constant 
for all i > 0. The optimal search strategy – defined as the strategy that maximizes expected 
payoff – is well known (see e.g., DeGroot, 1970). Suppose the price quotes are distributed 
according to the cumulative probability function )(⋅F . Then the decision maker should accept 
the current minimum price quote and stop the search, if and only if the current minimum price 
quote becomes not higher than a threshold price p*, where p* is determined by the following 
implicit equation: 
0)()*(
*
=−− ∫ ∞−
p
pdFppc . 
In the pilot experiment, c = 5 tokens or 15 tokens while )(⋅F  is a normal distribution with mean 
= 430 tokens and standard deviation = 50 tokens. The corresponding threshold prices can be 
obtained numerically using the above equation. In practice, the threshold prices discussed in the 
main text are the highest integer prices at which the left hand side of the above equation remains 
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positive. The expected number of searches, the expected purchase price, as well as the expected 
payoff under the optimal strategy can be computed numerically using the threshold prices; the 
results are listed in Table 1. 
Experiments 1 to 3 
The search task in Experiments 1 to 3 has increasing search costs in the form ikci ⋅=  
where k is a positive constant. The optimal strategy should involve an increasing sequence of 
threshold prices ...**,...*, 21 ippp , such that a decision maker should stop the search 
immediately after i searches if and only if the current minimum price quote becomes not higher 
than *ip  (see e.g., Kohn, M. G., & Shavell, S. (1974). The theory of search. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 9, 93-123). In particular, if the current minimum price quote is exactly *ip , 
the decision maker should be indifferent between continuing search and stopping. But since the 
threshold prices are an increasing sequence, even if the decision maker makes one more search, 
he/she must stop after the next search, since the minimum price quote at the point immediately 
after the next search cannot be higher than *ip , which is itself lower than *1+ip . In fact, there is 
a probability *)( ipF  that the decision maker would obtain a lower price quote than *ip  in the 
next search, in which case the conditional expected value of that price quote would be 
*)()(
*
i
p
pFppdF
i
∫ ∞− . There is at the same time a probability 1- *)( ipF  that the minimum price 
quote immediately after the next search remains *ip . To sum up, we must have: 
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which becomes, after simplification: 
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0)()*(
*
=−−⋅ ∫ ∞−
ip
i pdFppik . (A1) 
To check for consistency, differentiation of the right hand side as a function in *ip  yields: 
*),()(0)()*(
*
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i
pp
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∂
∫∫ ∞−∞−  
which must be positive for values of *ip  that solve the threshold price equation above. Thus the 
right hand side must be a strictly increasing function in *ip  in general. Since ik ⋅  increases with 
i, the threshold prices must be strictly increasing in i as well. The threshold prices for our setup 
in Experiments 1 to 3 are obtained numerically using (A1) and are as discussed in the main text. 
In practice, the threshold prices in Table A1 are the highest integer prices at which the left hand 
side of (A1) remains positive, and as such are the thresholds for acceptance (i.e., stopping 
search). The expected number of searches, the expected purchase price, as well as the expected 
payoff under the optimal strategy can be computed numerically using the threshold prices; the 
results are listed in Tables 2, 3, and 5. 
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Table A1. Threshold Prices Under the Optimal Strategy in Experiments 1 to 3 
Number of searches 
already carried out 
Cost in tokens for  
one additional search 
Threshold price in tokens 
for stopping 
1 5 384 
2 10 405 
3 15 419 
4 20 430 
5 25 439 
6 30 447 
7 35 455 
8 40 462 
9 45 468 
10 50 474 
11 55 480 
12 60 486 
13 65 492 
14 70 497 
15 75 503 
16 80 508 
17 85 514 
 
Note: The threshold prices are defined such that an expected payoff-maximizing DM should 
accept the current minimum price quote (i.e., stop search) upon having made i searches, if that 
price quote is lower than or equal to pi*. The threshold prices corresponding to ci = 5 tokens and 
15 tokens are also the threshold prices under the optimal strategy in the low and high search cost 
conditions in the pilot experiment, respectively. 
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Appendix B: Sample Experimental Instructions 
(UK/Low Search Cost Condition, the pilot experiment) 
 
SEARCH GAME 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
In this study you will make many decisions.  Your payment at the end of the study will depend 
on your decisions and luck.  
In case you have any questions, please raise your hand and the study coordinator will come to 
answer them. 
Please now switch off your mobile phone and all other communicating devices.  For the duration 
of the study, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. 
 
Description of the Game 
During this study, you will play the same game 45 times.   
In each game, you visit one or more shops to buy one product item.  When you visit a shop, you 
will see the price of the product at that shop.  After every visit, you can decide whether to visit 
one more shop or to buy the product. Once you decide to buy the product, the game will end 
immediately. 
To buy the product, you need to pay the lowest price among the shops that you have visited. On 
the other hand, you gain 700 tokens (the experimental currency used in this study that will be 
later converted to real money) from the product itself. 
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In addition, there is a search cost: after visiting the first shop, you have to pay 5 tokens for each 
additional shop that you visit.   
 
Therefore your earnings in the game is: 
700 tokens – The lowest price among the shops that you have visited  
– The total search cost of your visits 
Example 
You have just visited shop 4. The prices at the shops you have visited, and the costs of each 
visit, are as follow: 
 
                                      5 tokens                    5 tokens                  5 tokens    
 
Shop           1             2 3 4 
Price 
(tokens) 
        400           426 320 451 
 
That is, it costs you 5 tokens to visit shop 2, another 5 tokens to visit shop 3, and another 5 
tokens to visit shop 4. The total search cost of your visits is therefore 5+5+5=15 tokens. 
You now decide to buy.  The price you pay is then 320 tokens, which is the lowest price among 
the four shops you have visited. Your earnings in this game are therefore: 
700 tokens – 320 tokens – 15 tokens = 365 tokens 
 
How the prices are distributed among the shops 
The prices at the shops are independent from each other. However, they all follow a normal 
(“bell-shaped”) distribution with average of 430 tokens and standard deviation of 50 tokens. In 
the Appendix you can find a table and a graph charting the approximate chances that the price at 
a shop is in various price ranges. 
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Procedures 
You will enter all your decisions via the computer terminal in front of you. 
During each game, you will see on the computer a decision screen such as Figure 1 (all the 
figures are on p.5 and p.6). The decision screen lists the following from top to bottom: 
1. The number of the game you are playing 
2. The number of the shop you are visiting 
3. The price at the shop you are visiting (“The current price”) 
4. The lowest price you have seen from your visits 
5. The total search cost that you have incurred from your visits 
6. Your earnings if you buy now 
7. The additional search cost that you will incur if you visit one more shop 
8. The buttons that correspond to the decision you can make i.e. “Visit one more shop” or 
“Buy now” 
9. A “History” button which you can click to see a history screen like Figure 2, which lists 
the prices at all the shops you have visited.  When you are at a history screen, you can 
click the “Go back” button at the bottom of the screen to go back to the decision screen. 
 
To make a decision, click the button labeled with your choice i.e. either “Visit one more shop” or 
“Buy now”. 
 
After you click the “Buy now” button, the game ends and you will see on the computer a 
summary screen for the game, like Figure 3. 
 
First, you will play 5 practice games that will not count towards your cash payment. Then you 
will play 40 games for payment; of these games, the program will pick 3 games at random and 
pay you your average earnings from those 3 games at a rate of: 
 
1 token = £0.01. 
 
In addition, you will be paid a show-up fee of £3. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
If you don’t have any questions, please complete the quiz in the next page.  We shall come and 
check your answers shortly. 
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Figure 1.The decision screen 
 
Figure 2.The history screen 
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Figure 3. The summary screen 
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QUIZ 
Please fill in the blanks below. 
1. On average, the price at a shop is _____tokens. 
2. There is a ______% chance that the price at a shop is between 370 and 380 tokens. 
3. There is a ______% chance that the price at a shop is between 460 and 470 tokens. 
4. ______ games will be chosen randomly from ______ games to calculate your cash 
payment. 
5. Suppose you have just visited shop 5 and you find that: 
 
The price at shop 1 is 343 tokens; 
The price at shop 2 is 242 tokens; 
The price at shop 3 is 410 tokens; 
The price at shop 4 is 443 tokens; 
The price at shop 5 is 489 tokens. 
 
If you buy now, the price you pay is ____ tokens.  The total search cost of your visits is 
____ tokens.  Yours earnings are ____ tokens. 
 
 
 
 
----------------END OF INSTRUCTIONS------------- 
 
 
If you wish to participate in this study, please sign the consent form, and then wait patiently until 
all other players are ready to start. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The chances that the price at a shop is in various price ranges 
 
 
In Table Format: 
 
 
Price range in tokens Percentage chance that the price at a shop is in this range 
<330 2.3% 
330-340 1.3% 
340-350 1.9% 
350-360 2.6% 
360-370 3.4% 
370-380 4.4% 
380-390 5.3% 
390-400 6.2% 
400-410 7.0% 
410-420 7.6% 
420-430 7.9% 
430-440 7.9% 
440-450 7.6% 
450-460 7.0% 
460-470 6.2% 
470-480 5.3% 
480-490 4.4% 
490-500 3.4% 
500-510 2.6% 
510-520 1.9% 
520-530 1.3% 
>530 2.3% 
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Appendix C: Process Measure Questionnaire for Experiment 2 
 
For each of the following questions, please tick the box next to your answer: 
 
Q1: Imagine that a month ago, you made a nonrefundable deposit of bt1,300 on a weekend 
package at a seaside hotel. Since the reservation was made, however, you have been invited 
to spend the same weekend at a friend’s village house in the countryside. You would prefer 
to spend the weekend at the village house but if you don’t go to the seaside hotel, the bt1,300 
deposit will be lost. Where would you spend the weekend? 
□ Village house  □ Seaside hotel 
 
Q2: Imagine that on your way home you buy a microwave meal on sale for bt40 at the local 
grocery store. A few hours later you decide it is time for dinner, so you get ready to put the 
food in the oven. Then you get an idea. You call up your friend to ask if he would like to 
come over for a quick dinner and then watch a good movie on TV. Your friend says “Sure.” 
So you go out to buy a second microwave meal. However, all the on-sale microwave meals 
are gone. You therefore have to spend bt65 (the regular price) for the microwave meal 
identical to the one you just bought for bt40. You go home and put both dinners in the oven. 
When the two dinners are fully cooked, you get a phone call. Your friend is ill and cannot 
come. You are not hungry enough to eat both dinners. You cannot freeze one. You must eat 
one and discard the other. Which one do you eat?  
□ bt40 Meal  □ bt65 Meal  □ No preference 
 
Q3: You join a tennis club and pay a bt3,900 yearly membership fee.  After two weeks of 
playing you develop a tennis elbow. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 represents “very likely” and 
1 represents “very unlikely,” how likely would you continue to play (in pain)? 
□ 5    □ 4   □ 3   □ 2   □ 1 
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Appendix D: Learning Analysis 
 
For every experimental condition in our study, we test whether there was significant 
within-session learning among participants. To proceed, we divide the 40 games for payment in 
the session into two blocks, so that Block 1 includes Game 1 to 20 and Block 2 includes Game 
21 to 40. We then conduct, for each condition, a two-factor (Block 1 versus Block 2) within-
subject MANOVA with the number of searches and the purchase price as the dependent 
variables and participant as the unit of observation. The conditions include four from the pilot 
experiment, three from Experiment 1, four from Experiment 2 (defined by the 2 × 2 design 
discussed at the beginning of its Results section), and two from Experiment 3.  
We focus on testing for main effect of block; the results are summarized in Table A2. 
The tests do not yield a significant effect of block in almost every condition, with the single 
exception of one condition in Experiment 2, namely the Thai interface session under the Thai 
then English order. Simple effect tests for effect of block on the two dependent variables in that 
condition do not yield a significant effect for number of searches (F(1,31) = 0.34, p > .250, 
2
pη =.011) but a significant effect for purchase price (F(1,31) = 5.88, p = .021, 
2
pη =.159). Further 
examination shows that, even though there was some ostensible learning effect in this particular 
case, it only amounted to a decrease of 0.070 in the average number of searches (2.09% of the 
average number of searches in Block 1), and a decrease of 5.01 tokens in the average purchase 
price (1.32% of the average purchase price in Block 1), across blocks. 
We thus conclude that we have not detected an overall impact of within-session learning 
effects in our experiments. 
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Table A2. Test Results for Effect of Block in the Experimental Conditions 
Condition Wilks’ Lambda F p 
2
pη  
Pilot experiment 
UK/Low search cost .933 F(1,21)=1.52 .232 .067 
UK/High search cost .996 F(1,22)=0.10 >.250 .004 
Thai/Low search cost .913 F(1,22)=2.10 .162 .087 
Thai/High search cost .997 F(1,39)=0.10 >.250 .003 
Experiment 1 
UK 1.00 F(1,35)=0.00 >.250 <.001 
Thai (English interface) 1.00 F(1,34)=0.00 >.250 <.001 
Thai (Thai interface) 1.00 F(1,48)=0.03 >.250 <.001 
Experiment 2 
English then Thai/English interface 1.00 F(1,29)=0.00 >.250 <.001 
English then Thai/Thai interface .986 F(1,29)=0.41 >.250 .014 
Thai then English/English interface .997 F(1,31)=0.08 >.250 .003 
Thai then English/Thai interface .833 F(1,31)=6.22 .018 .167 
Experiment 3 
UK 1.00 F(1,17)=0.02 >.250 .001 
Thai 1.00 F(1,49)=0.05 >.250 .001 
 
